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Abstract
Since the 1970s almost all US states have introduced a form of joint custody after divorce.
I analyze the causal eﬀect of these custody law reforms on diﬀerent family outcomes. My
identiﬁcation strategy exploits the diﬀerent timing of reforms across the US states. Esti-
mations based on state panel data suggest that the introduction of joint custody led to an
increase in marriage rates, an increase in overall fertility (including a shift from non-marital
to marital fertility), and an increase in divorce rates for older couples. Accordingly, female
labor market participation decreased. Further, male suicide rates and domestic violence fell
in treated states. The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that joint custody
increased the relative bargaining power of men within marriage.
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The American family has undergone radical changes over the last decades. Marriage rates have
been falling over the last thirty years, cohabitation has emerged as an important social insti-
tution and divorce rates rose sharply from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s (Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2007). These dramatic demographic changes came along with an increased economic
independence of women and radical changes in family law. The economic literature has focused
so far on changes in divorce law. In particular, scholars have studied the impact of the move
from mutual consent to unilateral divorce laws.1
A further aspect of family law, namely custody law, has gained hardly any attention in
the literature.2 The allocation of custody, however, is a crucial aspect of every divorce since it
governs the actual post-divorce living arrangements. Many states have changed their custody law
fundamentally since the 1970s. Traditionally, after divorce, one parent was assigned sole custody,
and usually the mother was exclusively responsible for the child. The father was restricted to
speciﬁed visitation rights. In 1973, Indiana was the ﬁrst US state who introduced a law favoring
joint custody (Brinig and Buckley, 1998) and improved thereby the access of divorced fathers to
their children. Since then joint custody spread to nearly all US states.
No uniform approach to joint custody has emerged in these laws. However, certain aspects
have been widely approved (McKnight, 1991). First, courts award (joint) custody in accordance
with the best interests of the child. Second, a joint custody award may comprise both joint
legal custody and/or joint physical custody.3 And third, in almost all US states judges have
discretion to rule in favor of joint custody even without parents’ mutual consent. Researchers
have focused on the eﬀect of joint custody on children’s well-being. Proponents typically argue
that children may beneﬁt from ongoing support and resources from both parents. This is captured
in various dimensions such as behavioral adjustment (Bauserman, 2002), economic well-being
(Seltzer, 1991; Del Boca and Ribero, 1998; Allen et al., 2011), educational attainment (Leo,
2006; Nunley and Seals, 2011) and parental involvement (Bowman and Ahrons, 1985; Huang
et al., 2003). Opponents object that children under joint custody are exposed to ongoing parental
conﬂict (Kuehl, 1989). However, the causal relationship between custody arrangements and child
outcomes is far from clear and the empirical evidence is mostly inconclusive.
In this paper, I am concerned with an even more fundamental question: I explore if the intro-
duction of laws permitting joint custody after divorce has an impact on the incidence of marriage,
fertility and divorce. The move from sole custody to joint custody causes a redistribution of the
gains from marriage between spouses for the case of divorce (redistribution eﬀect). Assuming
1Most of the papers study the eﬀects of unilateral divorce law (and laws regarding the division of matrimo-
nial property) on divorce (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Peters, 1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006; Matouschek
and Rasul, 2008). Other outcomes are marriage (Rasul, 2003, 2006a), marriage and fertility (Alesina and Giu-
liano, 2007; Drewianka, 2008), marriage-speciﬁc investments (Stevenson, 2007), female labor supply (Gray, 1998;
Genadek et al., 2007; Stevenson, 2008), various child-outcomes (Johnson and Mazingo, 2000; Gruber, 2004;
Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito, 2008), and domestic violence and suicide (Dee, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006).
2The only paper that has previously examined the impact of joint custody laws on divorce is Brinig and
Buckley (1998). They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the introduction of joint custody on divorce rates. I am not aware
of any attempt to study the impact of custody law on marriage or fertility rates.
3Joint legal custody means that both parents share the right and the obligation of making major decisions
about their child’s upbringing. Joint physical custody means that the child spends a signiﬁcant amount of time
with each parent.
2that the outside option of divorce determines the bargaining power within marriage, I expect
a shift of power from women to men. Men (supposedly the short side of the marriage market)
should face a higher incentive to marry after the reform, and an increase in marriage rates can
be expected. Secondly, the option of joint custody may aﬀect the expected utility in the state
of divorce, and the expected cost of the divorce process (cost eﬀects). If joint custody reduces
the expected cost of divorce, the reform may increase the likelihood of divorce. However, joint
custody may also aﬀect spouses’ behavior during marriage and may change their incentives to
make marriage-speciﬁc investments, such as children (behavioral eﬀect). Men should be willing
to invest more in children, since this is now a less risky investment for them. If joint custody
causes an increase in aggregate incentive to invest, one should observe an increase in the value
of marriage and a raise in marriage and marital fertility rates. Higher levels of marriage-speciﬁc
investments should in turn reduce the likelihood of divorce. In sum, I expect the joint cus-
tody reform to increase the incidence of marriage, and to shift fertility from out-of-wedlock into
marriage. The impact on divorce rates is unclear due to countervailing eﬀects.
In order to identify the causal eﬀect of joint custody on diﬀerent family outcomes I exploit
the variation occurring from the diﬀerent timing of reforms across the US states. I provide
evidence that after the introduction of joint custody, marriage rates increased permanently in
adopting states. The delayed and increasing eﬀect on marriage is especially strong among sub-
groups with a plausibly higher awareness of custody law. There is evidence for a shift of fertility
from out-of-wedlock into marriage that follows a very similar pattern. The increase in marital
fertility exceeds the decline in non-marital fertility, and a signiﬁcant increase in total fertility
can be observed. These ﬁndings are supported by consistent eﬀects on labor market behavior
(i.e. a decrease in female labor force participation). The eﬀect of joint custody on the overall
incidence of divorce is less clear. However, there is stronger evidence for an increase in divorce
rates of spouses between 35 and 44 years of age. Finally, I ﬁnd that joint custody laws have
decreased (especially male) suicides and domestic violence. All these results are consistent with
the hypothesis that joint custody increased the relative bargaining power of men within marriage
by improving their expected utility after divorce. I conclude that joint custody has increased
men’s incentive to marry, the group which is supposedly more reluctant.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Among others, I provide evidence
on unintended consequences of custody law reforms. No attention was given to the potential
impact of joint custody laws on the incidence of marriage, fertility and divorce. Second, the
results help to understand family decision-making, and to evaluate models of distribution within
the family. Third, this paper clariﬁes diﬀerent layers of selection which have to be considered
when studying the eﬀect of joint custody on post-divorce (child) outcomes. Finally, the results
might be interesting for policy-makers, who typically worry about the decline in marriage rates,
and intend to encourage marriage, marital fertility and to prevent divorce.
The paper is organized as follows: First, I discuss potential eﬀects of joint custody on mar-
riage, fertility, and divorce. Then I present the identiﬁcation strategy and the data. The next
section discusses the main estimation results. Subsequently, I provide supporting evidence on the
impact of joint custody on labor market participation. Before I conclude the paper, I examine
the impact of joint custody on suicide and domestic violence.
32 Theoretical considerations
Divorce law typically necessitates a speciﬁed division of matrimonial property (including intan-
gible assets) in order to dissolve marriage legally. Concerning child custody the division was
traditionally very sharp: One parent became sole custodian and the other was restricted to spec-
iﬁed visitation rights. Although most states had a sole custody regime with a gender-neutral
rule since the 1980s – i.e. courts were supposed to decide in best interests of the child without
applying any presumption – mother sole placement has been the dominant arrangement in prac-
tice for a long time.4 In fact, its decline since the mid 1980s has been almost exclusively due
to the increasing number of joint custody arrangements and only to a very small extent due to
increases of male sole custodians (Cancian and Meyer, 1998). That means, one can presume a
sole custody regime with a de facto maternal preference in the following discussion.
After divorce, the family is separated in two households and it is no longer possible that the
parents spend time with their child jointly. In particular, the father’s tight time constraint may
aﬀect the child’s well-being adversely per se. On top of that the father also loses control over
child expenditures. He has hardly any opportunity to monitor and enforce an optimal level of
child expenditures. This may reduce his incentive to spend on the child (Weiss and Willis, 1985).
On the other hand, the mother will not internalize the eﬀects of her child-related actions on the
father. In sum, the return to child-investments is greater during marriage than after divorce,
and an ineﬃciently low level of child well-being may be observed in the divorce state.
Why does joint custody matter? There are several ways in which the move from a sole
custody regime with a de facto maternal preference to an institutional setting with joint custody
may aﬀect the decision to marry, to have kids and to divorce. In order to discuss potential
eﬀects of the introduction of joint custody, one has to consider diﬀerent preference orderings
over certain custody arrangements. I presume that parents are altruistic towards their children
in the sense that their utility depends on the welfare of their children. Consequently, it is a
natural starting point that parents are interested in spending time with their children and that
they want to remain custodian after divorce. I assume, therefore, that fathers prefer a joint
custody arrangement rather than giving sole custody to the mother. With respect to mothers
I do not make a restrictive assumption, since it is a priori not clear whether they prefer to
be sole custodian or to share parental rights and obligations with the fathers. Based on these
two possible preference orderings for mothers, I discuss the impact of the introduction of joint
custody. Thereby, I distinguish three diﬀerent channels, a redistribution eﬀect, a cost eﬀect, and
a behavioral eﬀect.
Redistribution eﬀect If both parents prefer joint custody over sole custody, the switch from
a sole custody regime to a joint custody regime is clearly appreciated by both. In this case
the reform should unambiguously increase the incentive to marry for both sexes. If only men
are in favor of joint custody, and women would prefer to keep the sole custody with maternal
preference, the joint custody reform causes a redistribution of the gains from marriage between
4Traditionally, a sole custody regime with strict paternal preference was in place; even when the father had
committed the marital fault. This changed in the nineteenth-century, when courts began to award custody to
the mother when the father was at fault (Mnookin, 1975). In the twentieth century the focus has shifted from
parental fault to the interests of the child. This ﬁrst resulted in a sole custody regime with maternal preference
and became later a gender-neutral rule system (Brinig and Buckley, 1998).
4spouses in the case of divorce. Given that men (women) gain (lose) from this redistribution they
should face a higher (lower) incentive to marry. In terms of an external threat point model (e.g.
Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981), which assumes that the outside option
of divorce determines the bargaining power within marriage, the changing incentives are caused
by a shift of bargaining power from women to men. In this situation, the eﬀect of joint custody
on marriage rates is a priori unclear, and depends on the condition of the marriage market. The
marriage market is a highly regulated market in the sense that there is typically only one type of
marriage contract available, which is given by family law. Consistent with this observation is the
common believe that men are typically more reluctant to marry. This would mean that there is
a disequilibrium on the marriage market, where men represent the short side.5 Assuming this is
true, then the introduction of joint custody should increase marriage rates, even if women would
prefer a sole custody regime.
Cost eﬀects There are possible cost eﬀects which may alter the incentive to divorce. First,
the additional option of joint custody after divorce may aﬀect the expected utility in the state
of divorce and aﬀect the divorce decision (of existing marriages). If both parents are actually
in favor of a joint custody agreement, the aggregate incentive to divorce clearly increases. As
compared to if the joint custody reform is only appreciated by men, the expected utility in
the state of divorce increases for men, and decreases for women. The impact on the aggregate
incentive to divorce is ambiguous. A further potential cost eﬀect operates through the cost of
the divorce process. Halla and Hölzl (2007) show that part of the parents who would not be able
to ﬁnd a mutually binding custody agreement in the sole custody regime can ﬁnd an agreement
in a joint custody regime. This is equivalent to a reduction in the cost of divorce.6 This cost
eﬀect should increase the aggregate incentive to divorce.
Behavioral eﬀect Finally, there is a potential behavioral eﬀect. The availability of joint
custody after divorce may aﬀect the spouses’ behavior during marriage. In particular, there is
a possible impact on the parents’ incentives to invest in children, or more generally to make
marriage-speciﬁc investments. Whether the introduction of joint custody increases or decreases
the incentive to invest is a priori not clear. However, at least for men it seems likely that they are
willing to invest more in children under joint custody, since they can expect to spend a substantial
amount of time with them even after potential divorce. If the joint custody reform causes an
increase in their aggregate incentive to invest, the value of marriage rises. This increases the
incentive to marry and one should observe an increase in marriage (and marital fertility) rates.
Symmetrically, if joint custody decreases the aggregate incentive to invest one should observe a
fall in marriage rates.
Moreover, if one thinks of divorce as a (partly) endogenous event, in the sense that the
likelihood of divorce is determined by the level of the spouses’ marriage-speciﬁc investment, the
5It is hard to prove this claim. However, one way to measure the willingness/incentives to marry among sexes
is given by survey data that directly asks individuals whether they would prefer to marry. Starting in 1976 and
continuing to the present, the Monitoring the Future study asks annually a nationally representative sample of
high school seniors the same set of questions on marriage. Examining several questions on marriage, one can
quickly see that the proportion of females who have a preference for (early) marriage is consistently higher than
the proportion of males. For a comprehensive discussion, see, Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001).
6In fact, their empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody in Austria enables more parents
to divorce by mutual consent (low cost) versus divorce by fault (high cost). However, they do not ﬁnd any impact
of the joint custody reform on the incidence of divorce.
5behavioral eﬀect could aﬀect the likelihood of divorce as well (Rasul, 2006b). In the case of an
increase in the aggregate investment, moving to joint custody should reduce the probability of
divorce and divorce rates are expected to fall. Whereas, if the joint custody reform decreases the
aggregate incentive to investment, divorce rates should go up.
Post-divorce time allocation Finally, under a joint custody regime, divorced mothers (fathers)
should spent on average less (more) time on parenting after divorce. This re-distribution of child
care responsibilities may aﬀect the time spent on the re-marriage market and, therefore, the
likelihood (and stability) of second marriages. This channel should increase the probability and
the stability of second marriages of women. For men, a reversed eﬀect can be expected; which
may oﬀset countervailing eﬀects discussed above.
Fertility Children are the key mechanism through which joint custody laws aﬀect the inci-
dence of marriage and divorce. Since the timing of marriage and fertility is ambiguous, one should
distinguish two cases. A changing marriage behavior may be triggered by existing children or
by planned fertility. In the ﬁrst case, parents (especially fathers) ensure the potential beneﬁts of
joint custody due to legitimization of children born out-of-wedlock. In the second case, spouses
think ahead and may be inﬂuenced by friends and family who went through divorce and had a
better experience with joint custody. The ﬁrst channel does not (necessarily) imply any impact
of joint custody on fertility. However, it is possible that the marriage decision (caused by joint
custody) leads to more fertility. The second channel implies – given that planned fertility is
realized – unambiguously an increase in marital fertility rates. Assuming fertility would have
also taken place in the counterfactual situation of cohabitation, joint custody should decrease
non-marital fertility, and the legitimacy ratio should go up. As discussed above, the existing
joint custody laws may increase the spouses incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments
(behavioral eﬀect). This eﬀect may apply to spouses who have married because of the joint cus-
tody reform (henceforth marginal marriages), as well as to couples who would have also married
without the reform (henceforth always-taking marriages). This channel may lead to an increase
in overall fertility.
To sum up, under realistic circumstances I expect the joint custody reform to increase mar-
riage rates. The impact on divorce rates is a priori not clear. There are possibly countervailing
eﬀects, and it remains an empirical question if and how joint custody aﬀects the incidence of
divorce. Given that, joint custody increases the incidence of marriage, a shift from non-marital
to marital fertility can be expected. That means, the legitimacy ratio should go up. Potentially,
joint custody may even aﬀect overall fertility rates. Accordingly, a change in female labor force
participation can be expected. A thorough discussion of the potential eﬀect of joint custody
on labor market behavior is provided in Section6.4 before I present the respective estimation
results.
3 Identiﬁcation strategy
The ﬁrst joint custody statute was passed in Indiana in 1973, and since then shared parenting has
spread to nearly all 50 states (see Table1). While there is no uniform approach to joint custody,
most statutes are comparable in the sense that parents are supposed to share the rights and
obligations concerning the child after divorce more equally compared to sole custody. Regarding
6the allocation of the joint custody awards, however, one should distinguish between statues that
require parental agreement and those who do not.7 In the ﬁrst case, the consent of both parents
is required in order to obtain a joint custody award. In the second case, judges have discretion
to rule in favor of joint custody (without parents’ mutual consent) if it conforms to the best
interests of the child. Unfortunately, there is not much variation across states and time. Most
of the states do not require a parental agreement. Only 6 states required at some point in time
parental agreement. Given the dominance of statues which do not require a parental agreement,
I use the wider deﬁnition in my empirical analysis below.8
The introduction of joint custody did not follow any systematic geographical patterns, and
no particularly small nor particularly large states have been early or late adopters; see Figure A.1
and A.2 in the W-A. There are also no systematic patterns with respect to political ideology
discernible. Indeed, there had been 24 Republican governors and 25 Democratic governors in
the state-years when joint custody laws were passed (see Table1). This apparently arbitrary
assignment of joint custody laws across states and time is corroborated by the assessment of the
legislative discourse of joint custody laws by Jacob (1988, Ch.8). He reports that joint custody
reforms were discussed by a small group of proponents (such as fathers’ groups, but also women
lawyers’ associations) and passed legislatures in relative obscurity. In sum, the diﬀerent timing
of joint custody reforms across the US seems to provide a useful quasi-experimental setting to
study the causal eﬀect of joint custody on family outcomes.9
First of all, I want to describe the development of joint custody awards after the reforms across
states. Therefore, I use micro-level data from divorce certiﬁcates provided by the National Vital
Statistics System (NVSS) of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). This data covers
divorces from all state-years in the so-called divorce-registration area. It captures the universe
of divorces in small states, and a representative sample in larger states. For each divorce basic
information, such as the number of children under 18 years of age, physical custody arrangement,
duration of marriage, and the spouses’ age, race, number of marriage and their state of residence,
is included. Information is available for the majority of states from 1968 to 1995, but the custody
allocation is recorded only from 1989 and onwards (Clarke, 1995). The information on custody
allocation is available on a family level (and not for each child). Joint physical custody is deﬁned
in the data as a minimum of 30% time share with each parent. The data does not include any
information on (joint) legal custody. In the 111 state-years in which joint custody is available,
it has been awarded in about 25% of all 179;997 cases, see TableA.1 in the W-A.
In order to ﬁnd out how the incidence of joint custody awards evolved in the years following
the reforms, I deﬁne the variable jci;s;t, which is equal to one if joint custody is awarded for all
7A further diﬀerentiation is whether joint custody statutes simply allow joint custody awards, or whether they
even include a preference or a presumption for it. (The latter two forms may only be applicable if both parents are
in agreement in requesting it.) However, this diﬀerentiation seems to be in practice quite unclear and therefore
hardly codeable. For instance, in the case of California (which language has become a model for many other
statues) there has been considerable confusion, even among legal scholars, whether it implies a presumption for
joint custody or not (McIsaac, 1991).
8If I restrict the deﬁnition of joint custody only to those 857 state-years where no parental agreement has been
required, I ﬁnd very similar results compared to the wider deﬁnition (927 state-years). In most of the cases the
eﬀect of joint custody increases in statistical signiﬁcance, see SectionA.5 of the Web-Appendix (henceforth W-A).
9It should be noted that given the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act from 1968 custody law in general
applies based on the child’s state of residence. That means, there is no chance to take advantage of (joint) custody
laws of other states by marriage or divorce ‘tourism’.
7children of family i (in state s in year t) and zero if sole custody is awarded for all children. I
estimate a probit model (with frequency weights), where I include a series of binary variables
equal to one if a state has introduced joint custody certain years ago, as explanatory variables
of special interest (dynamic model). Given the relatively small number of available state-years,
I will also report estimation results from a less demanding speciﬁcation, where I include a single
variable that captures the years since joint custody has been introduced (linear model). In each
case, I control for state ﬁxed-eﬀects, year ﬁxed-eﬀects, whether unilateral divorce is available or
not, and all available spouses’ characteristics. In additional speciﬁcations linear and quadratic
state-speciﬁc time trends are added.
Estimation results are summarized in Table2. Considering the richest speciﬁcation of the
linear model I ﬁnd that the probability of a joint custody award increases ceteris paribus by
about 3 percentage points each year after the introduction of joint custody. The dynamic model
suggest a similar growth pattern of joint custody, however, at a somewhat lower rate. Unilateral
divorce law has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of a joint custody award. The
micro-level control variables show some interesting regularities and highlight that joint custody
is not randomly assigned. For instance, the probability of a joint custody arrangement increases
with duration of marriage, the husband’s age at the time of divorce, and it decreases with the
number of the spouses’ prior marriages.
4 Data
I have to deﬁne a measure of the incidence of marriage, divorce, and fertility. The standard in
the literature seems to be crude marriage and divorce rates – i.e. the number of marriages
(divorces) per 1;000 of the total population (see, e.g., Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). However,
these two variables may hide much of the underlying variation of interest, because the population
‘at-risk’ is not considered properly. In case of marriage, the best measure would be the number
of marriages per 1;000 of the non-married population. Alternatively, one could also argue that
married people are at-risk to divorce and re-marry. In order to quantify the incidence of divorce
one would prefer to calculate the number of divorces per 1;000 of the married population.
However, there is a trade-oﬀ between the accuracy of the measurement and the extent of
available data. The stock of (non-)married people is not available, except for the years in which
the decennial US census has been conducted. Therefore, in a ﬁrst step, I quantify the incidence of
marriage and divorce based on series on the number of cases per 1;000 of the population between
15 and 55 years of age (henceforth adults). People in this age group should be the relevant sub-
population with respect to custody issues. In particular, I use the absolute number of marriages
and divorces from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics and combine this information with
state-level population data constructed from the Reading Survey of Epidemiology and End Results
provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research. For simplicity, I will refer to these
measures as marriage and divorce rates. These rates can be constructed for all states from 1969
through 2003 and should be suﬃciently long to cleanly distinguish the causal eﬀects of joint
custody from pre-existing trends in marriage and divorce rates.10
10I disregard Nevada from my analysis since its marriage market is (most probably due to Las Vegas) very
diﬀerent compared to the other states. The average marriage rate of Nevada is about 12 times higher than the
8In a second step, I use a proxy for the stock of married and non-married population to check
the robustness of the results. This proxy is constructed based on information on the stock of
married population from the decennial US Census from 1960 to 2000 and on the ﬂow into and out
of marriage from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics. This allows me to construct series
on the number of marriages per 1;000 non-married population (and the number of divorces per
1;000 married population) for all states from 1969 through 2000. Figure 1 compares the average
development of the diﬀerent measures of the incidence of marriage and divorce over time. In each
case, one can observe a sustained decline in marriage rates. Divorce rates at ﬁrst rose sharply,
peaked in the early 1980s and have been declining since then.
In a third step, I carry out a separate analysis of the eﬀect of joint custody on marriage and
divorce rates for demographic sub-groups. Group-speciﬁc marriage rates are based on micro-level
data from marriage certiﬁcates provided by the NVSS of the NCHS.11 This data includes basic
demographic characteristics of the spouses and is available for the majority of states, but as in the
case of divorces certiﬁcates only from 1968 until 1995. Unfortunately, the marriage certiﬁcates
data does not include any information on children. Older couples without kids, or with previous
kids that are older, could have served as a control group. Again, this data captures the universe
of cases in small states, and a representative sample in larger states. In particular, I calculate
marriage number- and age-speciﬁc rates, where I distinguish between the following age-groups:
20 to 24 years, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44 years, and 45 to 54 years.12
To test suppositions on fertility behavior I calculate annual age-speciﬁc fertility rates. Thereby
I distinguish between marital, non-marital, and total fertility rates – deﬁned as the absolute num-
ber of births to married, unmarried, and all mothers from a certain age-group per 1;000 female
population of this age-group. The absolute number of births is derived from micro-level birth
certiﬁcate data from the NVSS of the NCHS. Further, I deﬁne the legitimacy ratio, as the num-
ber of marital births divided by all births multiplied by 100. All data deﬁnitions and descriptive
statistics are provided in SectionA.1.1 of the W-A.
5 Estimation strategy
My research design enables a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) approach. The standard DiD esti-
mator imposes the restrictive assumption of an immediate and constant response to the policy
intervention (static model). Since these assumptions may not hold in case of joint custody re-
forms, I mainly focus on an empirical strategy suggested by Wolfers (2006) that imposes less
structure on the dynamic eﬀects of the policy intervention. In particular, I estimate a DiD panel
ﬁxed-eﬀects models, where the outcome variable Os;t is a measure of the incidence of marriage,
average of all other states. Its divorce rate is nearly the triple of the rest of the US.
11Group-speciﬁc divorce rates are constructed based on the aforementioned micro-level data from divorce cer-
tiﬁcates. Since I need here only basic information on the spouses, I can employ the full available time span starting
1968 through 1995.
12I do not analyze the eﬀect of joint custody on demographic outcomes of teenagers. This age-group is more
likely aﬀected by joint custody through an additional channel that operates through their parents’ reaction to the
reform. This additional channel complicates the interpretation of estimated eﬀects.
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(1)
and JCr
s;t denotes a series of binary variables equal to one if a state has introduced joint custody
r years ago (dynamic model). My empirical strategy is to identify whether joint custody law
explains the change in marriage (divorce, fertility) rates between states adopting joint custody
at a diﬀerent point in time. Therefore, the identiﬁcation of r is guaranteed by variation across
states and across years in which states adopted joint custody. The ﬂexible speciﬁcation allows me
to trace out the full adjustment path of marriage rates. I include lags up to 17 years following the
reform. That means, the eﬀects of joint custody, will be identiﬁed based on at least 32 treatment
states, see FigureA.6 in the W-A. For completeness, I will also report estimation results from
the standard static DiD model. Where possible, I report the estimated coeﬃcients as the percent
change in the respective rate due to the adoption of the joint law (evaluated using the unweighted
mean as the base).
For each outcome I compare three diﬀerent speciﬁcations: Speciﬁcation I controls for state
ﬁxed-eﬀects (s) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects (t). Speciﬁcation II adds linear state-speciﬁc time trends,
and speciﬁcation III comprises, in addition, state-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. Each of these
three speciﬁcations includes a rich set of control variables. First, I allow for the the possibility that
the introduction of joint custody is correlated with the move from mutual consent to unilateral
divorce laws. Under mutual consent law both spouses need to agree to divorce. Unilateral divorce
law allows either party to ﬁle for divorce without the consent of the other. This switch re-assigns
the right to divorce from being held jointly, to being held individually.13 I control for unilateral
divorce law in an equivalent way as for joint custody and include UDr
s;t.
Second, I control for the prevailing law for to the division of matrimonial property in divorce.
I distinguish between common property regimes (base group) and equitable property regimes
EPs;t. In the former regime, spouses were generally only entitled to assets they themselves
brought into marriage, while in the latter, property was generally divided more equally.
Third, I control for a further set of control variables (denoted by Xs;t) that comprises dif-
ferent age-at-marriage laws, legalized abortion, the sex ratio, the gross state product (GSP) per
capita14 and the whole sex-race-age-distribution of each state. The method of estimation is pop-
ulation weighted least squares and robust standard errors – allowing for clustering by state and
heteroskedasticity of unknown form – are calculated throughout. Data sources and deﬁnitions
of all control variables are provided in SectionA.1.2 of the W-A.
13There is a vivid debate in the economics literature whether the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce
laws has caused the large rise in divorce rates (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Peters, 1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers,
2006; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008), and whether it has increased (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007) or decreased
(Rasul, 2003, 2006a) marriage rates. With respect to fertility, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) ﬁnd a decrease in
non-marital and total fertility rates, with marital fertility rates remaining constant. Drewianka (2008) also ﬁnds
a decline in non-marital fertility. However, in addition, he reports an increase in total and marital fertility rates.
14The GSP is a potentially problematic control, since it may itself be inﬂuenced by joint custody laws (see
Section6.4). However, its exclusion changes the results only marginally.
106 Estimation results
First, I discuss the eﬀect of joint custody on marriage and divorce rates. Then I present the
analysis of fertility behavior and labor market participation. In a ﬁnal step, I consider the
impact on suicide rates and domestic violence.
6.1 The eﬀect on marriage
Results for marriage rates are summarized in Table 3 and in the upper panel of Figure2. The
standard static DiD model suggest a positive eﬀect of joint custody on marriage rates, how-
ever, the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. It seems crucial to relax the
assumption of an immediate and constant response of marriage rates due to the joint custody
reform.15 Each of the three speciﬁcations of the dynamic model shows that the introduction
of joint custody had no immediate impact on marriage rates, but ﬁnds a large and statistically
signiﬁcant increase in the marriage rate starting 5 years after the reform. Considering speciﬁca-
tion M-II, one can see that the annual rate of marriages per 1;000 adults increased on average
by 4:9% in treatment states (compared to control states) in the period of 5 to 6 years after the
reform. The eﬀect of the reform grows over time. Seven to eight years after the reform, I observe
an eﬀect of plus 6:6%. The full eﬀect of the reform after 17 years following the adoption of
joint custody is plus 9:2%. The average eﬀect over 18 years following the reform is about plus
5%. The quantitative impact of the joint custody reform is about twice of that of the change in
property law, and also higher than that of unilateral divorce law (see below).
A delayed and growing impact of the introduction of joint custody over time seems plausible
and supports a causal interpretation. First, a process of behavioral change requires a signiﬁcant
period of time, and one would not expect an immediate response. Second, the observed pattern
is in line with the development of joint custody awards following the years after the reform (see
Table2). Since it takes some time until joint custody is assigned, there might be a slow diﬀusion
of information on the new custody law. In a next step, people have to observe divorced couples
who share joint custody and learn that this is actually a good option. Only after potentially
beneﬁcial eﬀects of the law on life after divorce become evident, one would expect an eﬀect of
joint custody on the incidence of marriage.
The upper panel of Figure2 depicts the estimated coeﬃcients from the three speciﬁcations,
and also includes results from additional speciﬁcations. One of these controls (compared to spec-
iﬁcation M-III) also for leads starting at year minus 9 (or less) to check whether the increase
in marriage rates postdated the change in custody law. The coeﬃcients on the binary variables
capturing the periods prior to the joint custody law are individually and jointly statistically in-
signiﬁcant, quantitatively very small (basically zero) and do not exhibit a trend. The coeﬃcients
on the lags hardly change (see, also, TableA.2 in the W-A). So the timing evidence supports a
causal interpretation.
I test the sensitivity of the results to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. First, the result
is not sensitive to the speciﬁc modeling of the dynamic eﬀects of the reform. For instance, if I
15This can be illustrated by step-wise re-deﬁning the joint-custody-dummy to be one x years (x = 0;1;2;3;:::)
after the reform (and zero otherwise). By re-deﬁning some early years after the reform – where no eﬀect has yet
kicked in – the signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reform becomes visible; this applies to all outcomes under consideration.
11pool three years to generate the binary variables capturing the eﬀects of the reform I ﬁnd the
same pattern. Equivalently, the results are not sensitive to the speciﬁc number of lags included.
Second, I examine the robustness to the sample chosen. To test the importance of the time period
chosen, I skip in turn single years. It turns out that the omission of particular years does not
inﬂuence the results. I also omit, in turn, single states. For instance, I drop the most populated
states, California and New York, from the analysis. California is also one of the earlier adopters
of joint custody. However, the results are not very sensitive to these modiﬁcations of the sample.
Finally, one might be concerned with reversion to the mean. For instance, if marriage markets
had been out of equilibrium in 1968, and if treatment states were further from their long-run
equilibrium, there would have been convergence of marriage rates of treatment and control states.
I ran speciﬁcations where I control for the share of married population in 1960, interacted with
year ﬁxed-eﬀects. The results provide no evidence for convergence in marriage rates over time,
and the eﬀect of joint custody remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
While most of the control variables are statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variables of the
marriage rate, their inclusion has little impact on the eﬀect of joint custody as such. One can
see that the move to an equitable property regime signiﬁcantly reduces marriage rates (about
minus 2%). This result can be explained by an equivalent line of reasoning as in the case of joint
custody. A more equal division of custody improves the situation of men, and one expects an
increase in marriage rates. Whereas a more equal division of property in divorce is on average a
disadvantage for men, and a decrease in marriage rates can be expected.
In accordance with Alesina and Giuliano (2007) I observe in speciﬁcation M-III (and to a
lesser extent also in M-II) a positive eﬀect on marriage rates in states which have switched from
mutual consent divorce to unilateral divorce. In contrast, speciﬁcation M-I (which does not
control for any state-speciﬁc trends) suggests a (insigniﬁcant) negative eﬀect, as put forward by
Rasul (2003, 2006a). To the extent that Rasul (2003, 2006a) does not control for any state-
speciﬁc time trends (among other methodical diﬀerences), this comparison helps to reconcile
these conﬂicting results. Overall, however, one has to conclude that there is no robust eﬀect
of unilateral divorce law on the incidence of marriage; see also Drewianka (2008). The fact
that impact of joint custody is (compared to that of unilateral divorce law) more robust across
speciﬁcations and quantitatively more important also makes some intuitive sense. In the case of
joint custody law it is easier to understand how the legal change has aﬀected incentives for men
and women.
One might argue that the number of marriages per 1;000 adults is an imprecise metric, and
the analysis should be based on the number of marriages per 1;000 non-married population. If
I use the the number of marriages per 1;000 non-married population (based on the proxy for
the non-married population from 1969 through 2000) as the dependent variable, I ﬁnd the same
pattern as the last speciﬁcation in Figure2 shows. The results are very similar if I use the number
of marriages per 1;000 non-married females or males as the dependent variable.
In order to ﬁnd out which demographic sub-groups have reacted most strongly to the reform
I examine age- and marriage number-speciﬁc rates. Thereby, I follow an equivalent estimation
strategy as above. However, due to the restricted time span, I include only lags up to 11 years
following the reform. Figure3 summarizes the estimation results based on speciﬁcation III. Joint
12custody has increased the number of marriages across all groups. In the majority of the cases
the coeﬃcients of the estimated eﬀect of joint custody are statistically signiﬁcant starting 4 to
5 years after the reform. However, the eﬀect is quantitatively larger for spouses with divorce
experience and, somewhat surprisingly, for older spouses (35 years of age and older). Clearly,
spouses who went through divorce before should be more aware of (the potential implications
of) prevailing custody law. With respect to age, one could have expected a stronger eﬀect for
younger spouses. The opposite result may be explained by a higher awareness of the importance
of custody law among older spouses; older spouses and their respective peers are more likely to
have divorce experience. The marriage of older spouses (especially in the case of brides out of
childbearing age) can be motivated by the legitimization of children born out-of-wedlock due to
subsequent marriage. In fact, using the Current Population Survey, June 1995: Fertility and
Marital History Supplement to obtain a proxy for the incidence of legitimization, I ﬁnd evidence
that joint custody increased the incidence of legitimization (details are provided in SectionA.3
of the W-A). The fact that joint custody has a stronger eﬀect on the re-marriage of women
(compared to men) is consistent with the idea that joint custody provides divorced mothers
with a respite from parental duties that allows them more time to participate in the re-marriage
market. In sum, the separate analysis of demographic sub-groups is revealing and supports a
causal interpretation. However, it should also be noted that this analysis (and the respective
analysis in the case of divorce below) has less statistical power. The data is only available for a
sub-sample of state-years, and I cannot capture the precise population at-risk. Clearly, it would
be desirable to verify these results in better data if any opportunity arises.
6.2 The eﬀect on divorce
The baseline results of the eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates are summarized in Table3
and in the lower panel of Figure2. I do not observe a really clear-cut eﬀect of joint custody
on divorce rates. The majority of the coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations show a positive sign.
However, the estimates are mainly statistically insigniﬁcant. Still, speciﬁcation D-III shows
(with the exception of the lag on 9 to 12 years after the reform) a quantitatively increasing
impact of joint custody on divorce rates. It should be noted that Brinig and Buckley (1998) ﬁnd
a negative impact of joint custody on divorce. Possible reasons for diverging results are given by
their diﬀerent measurement of divorce (crude divorce rate), their shorter sample (1980 through
1991), the omission of state-speciﬁc time trends, and the inclusion of potentially endogenous
covariates (such as the female employment rate).
To get further insights I use the number of divorces per 1;000 married population as an
alternative dependent variable. This variable is based on my proxy variable for the share of
married population for all states from 1969 through 2000 explained above. Since joint custody
increased the number of marriages, there are more people at-risk to divorce, and divorces per
1;000 adults may be an inappropriate metric. The last speciﬁcation in Figure2 shows a similar
pattern, however, all coeﬃcients shrink in size.
The lack of a clear-cut eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates may be the result of coun-
tervailing eﬀects. As discussed above, on the one hand, joint custody decreases the cost of
divorce (cost eﬀect) which should increase divorce rates. On the other hand joint custody may
13increase marriage-speciﬁc investment (behavioral eﬀect, see also Section6.3 and 6.4) which could
decrease divorce rates. On top of that, joint custody may change the selection into marriage.
Since marginal marriages can be expected to be of lower match quality, this selection eﬀect may
increase divorce rates.
As in the case of marriage, I look at the eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates of demo-
graphic sub-groups. In particular, I analyze marriage-number and age-speciﬁc divorce rates.
The marriage number-speciﬁc divorce rates are the absolute number of divorces of the respective
group per 1;000 adult population. The age-speciﬁc rates are deﬁned as the absolute number of
divorces of females (males) per 1;000 female (male) population of this age-group. In accordance
with the analysis of the aggregate divorce rates almost all coeﬃcients show a positive sign and
lack of statistical signiﬁcance (see FigureA.7 and TableA.4 in the W-A). However, this more
detailed analysis reveals that the estimated positive eﬀect of joint custody on divorce is clearer
for spouses between 35 and 44 years of age. Since this age-group responded comparably strong
to reform in terms of higher marriage rates this supports the idea that marginal marriages are
of lower match quality.
With respect to the control variables, the results on unilateral divorce are worth mentioning.
In speciﬁcation D-I (see Table3) the results on unilateral divorce show the pattern described by
Wolfers (2006). I ﬁnd an immediate spike after the introduction that dissipates over time and
an eventual decline. After including state-speciﬁc linear time trends (see Speciﬁcation D-II) the
initial increase is more pronounced, also eventually declines, however, does not turn negative.
Finally, Speciﬁcation D-III (adding state-speciﬁc quadratic time trends) gives no eventual decline
in the eﬀects; and suggests a permanent increase. These results hold also for the number of
divorces per 1;000 of the married population. Correspondingly, Wolfers (2006, p.1816) concludes
that “[...] the eventual decline in the divorce rate is less robust, and a range of alternative
speciﬁcations suggests that this decline may be illusory”. That means, in my sample the ﬁnding
of a transitory (vs. permanent) increase in divorce rates depends on the speciﬁcation of state-
speciﬁc time-trends. In any case, it should be noted that for an explicit analysis of the impact
of unilateral divorce law, the sample should be ideally extended back as done by Wolfers (2006).
In sum, I cannot put forward very convincing evidence on the hypothesis that joint custody
had an overall impact on the incidence of divorce. However, I cannot rule out that joint custody
operates through diﬀerent channels that oﬀset each other. For instance, additional marriages
that would have not occurred under single custody may be of lower match quality (i.e. higher
likelihood of divorce), but due to increased marriage-speciﬁc investments (behavioral eﬀect), I
do not observe an overall impact on divorce rates.
Apart from the analysis of the marriage and the divorce rate – two ﬂow measures – it is
instructive to analyze the impact on the stock of currently married population. This analysis
should give the net eﬀect of the two ﬂow measures. It should be emphasized that the impact of any
intervention does not have necessarily the same sign on the ﬂow and the stock measurements.16
Unfortunately, no ideal data source exists to examine the eﬀect of joint custody on the stock
16For instance, an intervention may create additional marriages. However, if these additional marriages are
very instable, and/or the policy increases the divorce likelihood of existing (and/or subsequent ‘always-taking’)
marriages, the stock of married people may even decrease. In fact, this is what I observe for the introduction of
unilateral divorce law for all age-groups (except for females between 20 and 24 years of age). Detailed output is
available in TableA.9 in the W-A.
14of married people. The best available data-set, the Current Population Survey (CPS), has two
drawbacks: First, in early years many states are grouped together. Secondly, and probably more
severe, one can only capture an individual’s current state of residence – which may not be the
state of marriage or divorce, since the American population is extremely mobile. Still, by and
large, a micro-level data analysis of the eﬀect of joint custody on the stock of married population
gives results that are in line with observed patterns on the ﬂow in and out of marriage. As
expected, I observe for the majority of the sub-groups that joint custody had a positive eﬀect on
the probability of being currently married. Details are provided in SectionA.4 the W-A.
6.3 The eﬀect on fertility behavior
The introduction of joint custody, and in particular the results on the incidence of marriage,
have testable implications for fertility behavior. Given that the increase in marriage rates is not
only driven by the legitimization of children born out-of-wedlock (or changing post-divorce time
allocation), I expect an increase in marital fertility rates. Further, a decrease in non-marital
fertility rates and an associated increase in the legitimacy ratio can be expected.
In order to verify these suppositions I use annual age-speciﬁc (total, marital, and non-marital)
fertility rates for all states (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2002. The age-speciﬁc (marital,
non-marital) fertility rate is deﬁned as the absolute number of births to all (married, unmarried)
mothers from a certain age-group per 1;000 female population of this age-group. Further, I
deﬁne the age-speciﬁc legitimacy ratio as the number of marital births divided by all births to
mothers from a certain age-group multiplied by 100. Information on legitimacy of new-borns is
not available for 120 state-years, since not all authorities recorded information on the mothers’
marital status.
Estimation results based on an equivalent estimation strategy as in the case of marriage and
divorce are summarized in Table4. As expected, I observe a positive eﬀect of joint custody
on marital fertility. One can see patterns in accordance with the results on marriage rates –
the eﬀect on marital fertility rates grows as well in absolute terms over time. However, the
coeﬃcients are only individually signiﬁcantly for the group of females between 35 to 44 years
of age, and partly for those between 25 and 34. The average eﬀect over 18 years following
the reform is about plus 8% for the former group, and the long run eﬀect amounts to 14%.
There is also some evidence for a decrease in non-marital fertility. This indicates that marginal
marriages would have had children in the counterfactual situation of cohabitation. However, the
estimated coeﬃcients are only jointly and not individually statistically signiﬁcant. Accordingly,
I observe positive (but mostly individually statistically insigniﬁcant) eﬀects on the legitimacy
ratio. Notably, the increase in marital fertility did not only oﬀset the decrease in non-marital
fertility, but joint custody increased overall fertility rates (signiﬁcantly for women 25 years of
age and older). That means, existing joint custody laws have increased spouses willingness to
make marriage-speciﬁc investments. To which extent additional fertility is within the marginal or
always-taking marriage cannot be disentangled. Figure4 shows that the statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects of joint custody on fertility behavior exhibit a plausible timing that supports a causal
interpretation of these results; see also FigureA.9. With respect to the quantitative importance,
it can be noted that the eﬀects of joint custody law on fertility behavior are typically smaller
15compared to those of unilateral divorce law. The introduction of unilateral divorce law shows
patterns very similar to those described by Drewianka (2008); Alesina and Giuliano (2007). I
ﬁnd a clear and strong decrease in non-marital fertility, and an increase in the legitimacy ratio.
Compared to Alesina and Giuliano (2007), I also ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
(marital) fertility of females between 35 to 44 years of age.
Finally, I consider the eﬀect of joint custody on abortion. Given the ﬁndings of the eﬀect
of joint custody laws on the incidence of marriage and fertility, one would expect a negative
impact. To measure the incidence of abortion, I use the abortion rate (absolute number of
abortions per 1;000 females between 15 and 44 years of age) and the abortion ratio (absolute
number of abortions per 1;000 live births). As expected, I observe for both outcome variables a
negative impact of joint custody that grows in absolute terms over time. However, this eﬀect is
sensitive to the inclusion of state-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. This latter speciﬁcation gives an
eﬀect of join custody that follows an inverted U-shape over time. Detailed estimation output can
be found in TableA.5 and FigureA.10 in the W-A. In sum, the ﬁndings on fertility corroborate
my suppositions and constitutes additional supportive evidence for the ﬁndings on the incidence
of marriage presented above.
6.4 The eﬀect on labor force participation
In this section, I want to examine the eﬀect of joint custody on labor market behavior. This may
provide additional supportive evidence for the results presented so far. Moreover, it may help us
to further our understanding of how joint custody laws have altered intra-household bargaining,
and the resulting incentives for spouses to make marriage-speciﬁc investment.
Joint custody law may aﬀect labor force participation for several reasons. First, since it
increases marriage and marital fertility rates, a decrease in labor force participation of females
(especially married females) can be expected.17 Second, joint custody may also change female la-
bor force participation through a change in relative bargaining power within marriage. Assuming
that the outside option of divorce of each spouse determines his or her bargaining power within
marriage, a shift in bargaining power toward husbands can be expected. Whether a reduced
bargaining power of wives should increase or decrease their labor force participation is a priori
not clear.18 Finally, joint custody may aﬀect the labor force participation of divorced spouses
through a redistribution of child care responsibilities. Under a joint custody regime divorced
mothers (fathers) should spent on average less (more) time on parenting after divorce. This
may increase (decrease) the labor force participation of divorced females (males). Alternatively,
women may spent their additional time on the re-marriage market; which increases their likeli-
hood of re-marriage, and that in turn could decrease their labor force participation.19 In sum,
one cannot derive a clear prediction for the eﬀect of joint custody laws on labor force participa-
17For married men I expect, if at all, relatively little eﬀects, since existing empirical evidence (e.g. Angrist and
Evans, 1998) shows that men’s labor market behavior is typically largely insensitive to exogenous shocks, such as
variation in family size.
18For instance, Gray (1998) ﬁnds that married women engage in less market work when they lose bargaining
power. In contrast, Chiappori et al. (2002) put forward that bargaining power and female labor supply are
inversely related.
19In addition, a comparably higher number of children of divorced spouses (in joint custody regimes) may
increase the overall parenting time, and decrease the labor force participation of either or both spouses.
16tion. However, given the estimated eﬀect of joint custody on (marital) fertility, a decrease in the
labor force participation of (married) females seems likely.
An empirical test of this hypothesis is, however, complicated for two reasons. First, no ideal
data to test this supposition is available, and second the fact that joint custody changes the
likelihood of marriage and divorce may generate selection eﬀects. A separate analysis of married
and divorced women may confound the causal channels discussed above with selection eﬀects due
to a changing composition of the stock of married and divorced population. Therefore, I proceed
in two steps. First, I apply my estimation strategy from above to identify the overall eﬀect of
joint custody on labor force participation (i.e. for all women). I still expect here a negative eﬀect
of the reform, since non-divorced women should dominate anyways. In a second step, I restrict
the analysis to the sample of married women. While it is hard to assess how joint custody laws
change the selection into (and out of) marriage with respect to marriage-speciﬁc investment, and
thus whether the selection eﬀects should lead to a ﬁnding of less or more investment, similar
results as in the case of all women would be at least reassuring. The best available data set is
the CPS. As argued above, one drawback of this data is that it only includes information on
the current state of residence. However, given that custody law in general applies based on the
child’s state of residence (see Section5 in paper) spouses should make their current labor force
participation decision based on the prevailing custody law in their current state of residence.
Whereas their marriage decision has been potentially made under the prevailing custody law in
their former state of residence. A second drawback is given by the fact that 31 states are grouped
together between 1969 and 1972, 37 states are grouped together between 1973 and 1976, and I
cannot include observations from these 272 state-years.
Based on micro-level data I estimate the probability that a women (in a speciﬁc age-group)
is currently in the labor force. As method of estimation, I use a linear probability model with
frequency weights, where I include the same set of covariates as in speciﬁcation III of equation
(1).20 Table5 summarizes the results for the sample of all women and married women only.
As expected, I ﬁnd for women in all age-groups (except for women between 45 and 54 years
of age) a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in likelihood of being in the labor force. As in the
case of marriage and fertility rates, the eﬀect of the reform grows in absolute terms over time.
The average eﬀect over 18 years following the reform is across these age-groups about minus 4
percentage points. The diﬀerent pattern for women above 45 years of age may be explained by the
fact that this group had undergone investment in human capital (longer) before the introduction
of joint custody and/or child care responsibilities are less binding. The upper panel of Figure5
shows that the eﬀect of joint custody can be disentangled from pre-existing trends. However, in
the case of women between 35 and 44 years of age, surprisingly, the inclusion of leads has an
impact on the estimated eﬀect. If I restrict the analysis to the (potentially selected) sample of
married women, I ﬁnd comparable patterns. In accordance with Stevenson (2008), the control
variables on unilateral divorce law show a positive eﬀect on female labor force participation.
20Note, instead of controlling for the race-age distribution, I include race and age dummies. In order to capture
the full eﬀects of the reform, I do not include any individual controls that might be aﬀected by the reform (such
as marital status or children). For an alternative speciﬁcation see TableA.6 in the W-A.
176.5 The eﬀect on suicide and domestic violence
The introduction of joint custody improved the situation of men (after divorce) and should
have increased their relative bargaining power within marriage. Given that this supposition is
consistent with the empirical results so far, one should be able to discern a higher level of well-
being of men – within marriage and after divorce. In the case of women, the prediction is less
clear. First, depending on their preferences, women may actually be in favor of a joint custody
arrangement. Secondly, even if not, their loss of bargaining power may be compensated by men’s
increased willingness to marry and to make marriage-speciﬁc investment.
In order to quantify men and women’s well-being, I follow Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) and
examine the eﬀect of the legal change on the incidence of suicide and domestic violence. In par-
ticular, I examine the eﬀect of joint custody on sex-speciﬁc suicide rates of the total population.
The choice of the dependent variable is motivated by data limitations (suicide rates by marital
status are only available since 1978) and by the fact that joint custody aﬀects the likelihood of
marriage and divorce. I use (an updated version of) the data provided by Stevenson and Wolfers
(2006) and examine the period from 1964 through 2003. For comparability, I follow their ba-
sic speciﬁcation (see Table I in their paper) and enhance this by controls for the introduction
of joint custody, all the additional control variables (available for this time span), and state-
speciﬁc time trends. Table6 summarizes the estimation results. In accordance, with Stevenson
and Wolfers (2006) I ﬁnd an negative impact of unilateral divorce law on female suicide and a
positive eﬀect for men. In contrast, joint custody laws caused a decline in both sexes’ suicide
rates that increased over the years following the reform. For males, each speciﬁcation yields
comparable results, and the timing evidence (see upper panel of Figure6) supports a causal
interpretation. Male suicide rates declined about 9% (speciﬁcation MS-III) in the long run in
states that adopted joint custody laws. For females, the results are sensitive to the inclusion
of state-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. Quantitatively the estimated coeﬃcients are quite sim-
ilar to those of males, however, individual statistical signiﬁcance vanishes after the inclusion of
state-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. Moreover, as the lower panel of Figure6 shows, in the latter
speciﬁcation, it is also harder to disentangle the eﬀect from pre-existing trends.
To examine the eﬀect of joint custody on domestic violence, I use the cross-sectional survey
data provided by Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). This data provides information on diﬀerent
types of domestic violence within intact marriages (from the majority of states) for the years
1976 and 1985. This allows me to compare changes in domestic violence among households from
21 treatments states (states who have adopted joint custody between 1976 and 1984) to those
from 14 control states (states who adopted joint custody after 1985). For details see TableA.7
in the W-A. Based on the richest speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd evidence that joint custody laws reduced
overall violence from husband to wives by about 2:7 percentage points.21 Given an average
incidence rate of 11:7%, overall violence appears to have declined by about a ﬁfth in treatment
states between 1976 and 1985.
21I do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on severe violence. Severe violence is deﬁned as kicking, biting,
hitting with ﬁst, hitting or trying to hit with something, beating up a partner, threatening with gun or knife, or
using a gun or a knife, in the past year. Overall violence also includes throwing something at partner, pushing,
grabbing or shoving, and slapping.
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Under joint custody, parents share access to their child and child-rearing responsibilities even
after the divorce. So far, the literature has paid little attention to the potential far-ranging eﬀects
of custody law. I utilize the variation occurring from the diﬀerent timing of custody law reforms
across the US to identify causal eﬀects of joint custody laws on diﬀerent family outcomes.
The results show a clear long-run increase in marriage rates, beginning 5 years following
the reform. The delayed and increasing causal eﬀect on marriage is consistent with the gradual
dissemination of joint custody awards. The impact on the incidence of marriage is strongest for
spouses above 35 years of age, and for spouse with past divorce experience – a sub-group with
a plausibly higher awareness of custody law. I ﬁnd a shift of fertility from out-of-wedlock into
marriage (i.e. the legitimacy ratio goes up) that is not as statistically signiﬁcant, however, which
follows a very similar pattern. The increase in marital fertility exceeds the decline in non-marital
fertility, and I observe an increase in total fertility. In line with the results on marriage, changes
in fertility behavior are most pronounced for women above 35 years of age. The changes in
marital and fertility behavior, are also reﬂected in a changing labor market behavior of women.
Joint custody laws decreased female labor force participation. The eﬀect on the overall incidence
of divorce is less clear. However, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for an increase in divorce rates for
spouses between 35 and 44 years of age – the group with a comparably high share of marginal
marriages. Finally, there is evidence that the introduction of joint custody has decreased suicide,
with a stronger impact for men, and has lead to a fall in domestic violence. This empirical
evidence supports the idea that joint custody increased the relative bargaining power of men
within marriage by improving their expected utility after divorce. In other words, joint custody
increased the incentive to marry for men – the group which is typically more reluctant to marry.
The results have important implications. First, the paper has documented unintended con-
sequences of custody law reforms. No attention was given to the potential consequences on the
formation and dissolution of families. However, in fact joint custody reforms have dampened the
ongoing decline of the traditional organization of the family, and have reinforced the traditional
division of labor within the family. Second, they help to understand how decisions are made in
families, and to evaluate models of distribution within the family (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).
To the extent that eﬀect of joint custody on marriage-speciﬁc investment (such as children and
home production) is caused by a shift in bargaining power, the results provide supportive ev-
idence for external threat point models that rely on the spouses’ outside options to determine
intra-household distribution. In contrast, internal threat models (such as separate-spheres mod-
els) or common-preference models predict no impact of joint custody laws on relative bargaining
power within the household. Third, as in the case of unilateral divorce law, my empirical analy-
sis can be regarded as a test of the Coase Theorem. Becker et al. (1977) argued that if spouses
can bargain eﬃciently, the Coase theorem implies that a change in divorce law only aﬀects the
distribution of welfare within marriage, but not the incidence of marriage or divorce. Unilateral
divorce simply re-assigns the right to divorce from being held jointly, to being held individually.
Equivalently, under a sole custody regime, the right to spend time with the child after divorce
is held individually. The introduction of joint custody re-assigns this right to being held jointly.
The results can be interpreted as evidence that spouses may be unable to bargain eﬃciently
19over time with the child (e.g. due to transactions costs or the existence of private information).
Fourth, there are important implications for the literature studying the impact of custody law
on any (child) outcome. I directly showed that couples with joint custody awards are selected.
Given that joint custody has an impact on the incidence of marriage, fertility, and divorce, further
potential layers of selection have to be considered. Finally, the results should be of considerable
interest to policy-makers. For varying reasons the public worries about the decline in marriage
and policy-makers have on their agenda to increase marriage rates. A large number of polices
have been designed in the US to increase the incidence of marriage and marital fertility and to
stabilize existing marriages. In the case of joint custody, no attention was given to its potential
marriage promoting eﬀect when it was considered. Based on the interpretation that joint custody
increased marriage rates by increasing the incentive to marry for men – the short side of the
marriage market – the paper points out a more general phenomenon that is amenable to policy
intervention. The state may deregulate (or re-regulate) the marriage market by allowing (or
oﬀering a range of) diﬀerent marriage contracts, which may increase the incidence of marriage.
In principal, a ﬁrst step in this direction is given by the introduction of the additional option of
covenant marriages (Brinig, 1999).
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Figure 1: Development of marriage and divorce ratesa
a This graphs summarizes the development of average marriage and divorce rates based on
annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2003, and 2000 respectively.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Years since joint custody reform 0.006*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.002) 0.029*** (0.016)
Dynamic model:
Joint custody in eﬀect for
year 2-3 0.041** (0.021) 0.033 (0.039) 0.086** (0.035)
years 4-5 0.025 (0.023) 0.016 (0.039) 0.075** (0.036)
years 6-7 0.072** (0.030) 0.048 (0.043) 0.103*** (0.039)
years 8-9 0.072** (0.036) 0.058 (0.044) 0.102*** (0.039)
years 10-11 0.059 (0.044) 0.060 (0.047) 0.117*** (0.041)
years 12-13 0.079 (0.053) 0.073 (0.050) 0.138*** (0.045)
years 14-15 0.104 (0.065) 0.072 (0.055) 0.138*** (0.053)
years 16+ 0.096 (0.071) 0.063 (0.057) 0.151** (0.062)
Unilateral divorce law
c 0.064 (0.042) 0.162 (0.119) 0.047 (0.053)
Number of children under 18
d
Two minors 0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)
Three minors -0.011*** (0.004) -0.011*** (0.004) -0.011*** (0.004)
Four minors -0.029*** (0.006) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.029*** (0.006)
Duration of marriage 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
Spouses’ age at decree
Age of wife 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Age of husband 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Number of this marriage
Wife’s # -0.006** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003)
Husband’s # -0.031*** (0.003) -0.031*** (0.003) -0.031*** (0.003)
Spouses’ race
e
Only wife is white -0.074*** (0.007) -0.075*** (0.007) -0.075*** (0.007)
Only husband is white -0.047*** (0.009) -0.047*** (0.009) -0.047*** (0.009)
Both spouses are non-white -0.122*** (0.004) -0.122*** (0.004) -0.123*** (0.004)
Place of residence
f
Only wife is resident -0.111*** (0.012) -0.111*** (0.012) -0.111*** (0.012)
Only husband is resident -0.027 (0.017) -0.027 (0.017) -0.027 (0.017)
Neither is resident 0.002 (0.019) 0.002 (0.019) 0.002 (0.019)
State and year ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes
State-speciﬁc linear time trends no yes yes
State-speciﬁc quadratic time trends no no yes
Mean of dependent variable In 25% joint custody is awarded for all children
a This table summarizes estimation results based on micro-level divorce certiﬁcate data from the National Vital Statistics
System of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) (National Center for Health Statistics, 1997). It covers 179;997
divorces from all state-years in the so-called divorce-registration area from 1989 through 1995. For details, see, TableA.1
in the W-A. Besides cases with missing information, 3;011 cases where custody is awarded to a third person, and 7;072
cases where the custody arrangement consists of a combination of mother sole custody, father sole custody and/or joint
custody are excluded. The dependent variable is equal to one if joint custody (i.e. a minimum of 30% time share with
each parent) is awarded for all children, and zero if sole custody is awarded for all children. Note, the NCHS does not
provide their deﬁnition of joint custody in any oﬃcially published document, however, Kuhn and Guidubaldi (1997) quote
a personal communication with Sally C. Clarke from the NCHS. Estimated using a probit model with frequency weights.
Marginal eﬀects with robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state-year and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in
parentheses are reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
b Estimation output for control variables (which are the same as in the case of the dynamic model below) is not listed; but
available upon request. c In 59 state-years unilateral divorce law is available. d Base group: one minor. e Base group: both



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Figure 2: The eﬀect of the adoption of joint custody on marriage and divorce rates
(percent change)a
a These graphs summarize estimation results of the eﬀect of joint custody on marriage and divorce rates based on annual
US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2003, and 2000 respectively. In the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations the
marriage (divorce) rate is deﬁned as the absolute number of marriages (divorces) per 1;000 of the population between 15
and 55 years of age and the number of observations is equal to 1;711 (1;675). In the last case the marriage (divorce) rate is
deﬁned as the absolute number of marriages (divorces) per 1;000 of the non-married (married) population and the number
of observations is equal to 1;558 (1;536). Each estimation includes the same set of control variables as the respective
speciﬁcation of the dynamic model in Table3. Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the
dependent variable). Estimated eﬀects are the percent change in the marriage/divorce rate due to the adoption of joint
custody the stated number of years ago.
27Figure 3: The eﬀect of the adoption of joint custody on group-speciﬁc marriage
rates (percent change)a
a These graphs summarize estimation results of the eﬀect of joint custody on group-speciﬁc marriage rates
based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 1995. Several state-years are
missing; see notes to FigureA.3 in the W-A. The dependent variables are marriage number-speciﬁc marriage
rates, and spouses’ age-speciﬁc marriage rates, respectively. Each estimation includes as control variables,
state and year ﬁxed-eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear and quadratic time trends, the introduction of unilateral
divorce law (with lags up to 11 years after the reform), the prevalence of equal property division in case
of divorce, the minimum legal ages at marriage, legalized abortion, the gross state product per capita, the
adult sex ratio, and the whole sex-race-age-distribution of each state. Further details on all variables are
provided in SectionA.1 in the W-A. Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of
the respective dependent variable). Estimated eﬀects are the percent change in the respective group-speciﬁc
marriage rate due to the adoption of joint custody the stated number of years ago. Full estimation output







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Figure 4: The eﬀect of the adoption of joint custody on age-speciﬁc (marital)
fertility rates with leadsa
a These graphs summarize estimation results of the eﬀect of joint custody on age-speciﬁc (marital) fertility
rates based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2002. Each speciﬁcation
(in each panel) is equivalent to that presented in Table4, however, also controls for leads starting at year
minus 9 (or less). Estimated eﬀects are the percent change in the respective fertility rate due to the adoption






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Figure 5: The eﬀect of the adoption of joint custody on female labor force partici-
pation with leadsa
a These graphs summarize estimation results of the eﬀect of joint custody on the probability of (married)
women in a age-speciﬁc group to be in the labor force based on micro-level data from the CPS (excluding
Nevada) from 1969 through 2003. Each speciﬁcation (in each panel) is equivalent to that presented in Table5,
however, also controls for leads starting at year minus 9 (or less). Estimated eﬀects are the percentage point
change in the age-speciﬁc probability to be in the labor force due to the adoption of joint custody the stated





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Figure 6: The eﬀect of the adoption of joint custody on suicide rates with leadsa
a These graphs summarize estimation results of the eﬀect of joint custody on sex-speciﬁc suicide rates based
on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1964 through 2003. Each speciﬁcation (in each panel)
is equivalent to the respective speciﬁcation of the dynamic model presented in Table6, however, some also
controls for leads starting at year minus 9 (or less). Listed coeﬃcients are reported as the percent change in
the sex-speciﬁc suicide rate due to the adoption of joint custody the stated number of years ago.
34